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The Arab Spring and Women’s (Cyber)activism: “Fourth Wave Democracy in the 
Making?”  
Case Study of Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco 
 




According to Huntington’s (1991) theory of “reverse democracy”, countries undergoing 
(or having undergone) a transition to democracy during a wave are always subject to democratic 
backsliding in the subsequent wave. During the third wave democratization, the fall of the Soviet 
Union and other despotic regimes in Latin America led to the gradual “autocratization” of many 
of these countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s. More recently, in 2011, the collapse of several 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region underscored important 
aspects of democratization, a process in which both women and new media technologies played a 
key role. However, the direct aftermath of the Arab Spring also revealed a significant democratic 
backsliding with the outbreak of civil and tribal wars in the region, the rise of political Islam to 
power, and the resulting backlash against women’s socio-political and legal rights. Drawing on 
Huntington’s theory of “reverse democracy”, I question whether, and to what extent, the Arab 
Spring could constitute a case of “fourth wave democracy”—especially considering that this most 
recent wave has been little, if not at all, explored and analysed. To do so, I adopt a feminist 
perspective that foregrounds the role of gender as the primary focus of my analysis to examine 
how the Arab Spring exemplified aspects of a “reverse democracy”, namely in terms of its impact 
on women’s rights and their resulting social status in the aftermath of the uprisings. I take three 
countries as case studies: Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. 
 
Keywords: Arab Spring, Fourth wave democratization, Reverse Democracy, Middle East and 





In The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Huntington (1991) 
discusses his theory of “third wave democratization”, in which he relates the story of democracy’s 
latest recognized wave with the fall of the Soviet Union and several autocratic regimes in Latin 
America in the early 1990s. His main idea is that countries undergoing or having undergone a 
transition to democracy during a wave are always subject to democratic backsliding in the period 
immediately following this wave—a development that he characterizes as “reverse democracy”. 
 
1 Maha Tazi is a Ph.D. candidate in the Communication Studies Program at Concordia University. Her work focuses 
on women’s creative disobedience and art activism in post Arab Spring North Africa. Maha 
is currently working on an audiovisual production called "103-13" to raise awareness on the extent and effects of 
gender-based violence in Morocco and the existence of laws that criminalize such forms of abuse. 
Maha taught a Critical Race Feminisms course at the Simone de Beauvoir Institute at Concordia and a 
Media Criticism course in the Communication department. 
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In the context of the third wave, a major backsliding was evident not only in the rise of autocratic 
regimes in many Eastern European and Latin American countries starting in the mid 1990s’, such 
as in Poland and Honduras, but also in the ensuing “war on terror” following the 9/11 attacks and 
the 2008 Great Recession. These developments have also significantly impacted women, in terms 
of their resulting status in the “reverse democracy” phase and undermined their social and political 
rights. For instance, Lila Abu Lughod (2002) underscores how the United States primarily used a 
narrative of Muslim women’s victimization to justify their 2001 war on terror on Afghanistan. 
Under the pretext of “saving Muslim women” (p.1) from the shackles of patriarchal Muslim and 
Arab men, the US intervention sought to liberate local women in Western and imperial terms—
that is, without a culturally-sensitive project for women’s emancipation. As a result, the 
intervention only furthered Afghani women’s seclusion as a reaction against the US military and 
cultural invasion. 
More recently, the collapse of several authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North 
African (MENA) region in the context of the Arab uprisings of 2011, namely in Egypt, Tunisia, 
and Libya, underscored important aspects of democratization; however, the direct aftermath of the 
Arab Spring has also revealed a significant backlash against both democratic development and 
women’s rights in the region. In fact, a few months after the apparent beginning of the democratic 
transitions, most of the Arab political openings closed, thereby causing an inevitable pull-back that 
was mainly noticeable in the rise of Islamist parties to power and the subsequent series of political, 
social, and humanitarian crises that are currently devastating the region, including the Syrian and 
Iraqi civil wars, the Libyan tribal war, and the refugee crises that spread to the European continent 
and beyond. Moreover, Arab women were also deliberately excluded from political participation 
and decision-making posts in the aftermath of the revolutions despite playing leading roles in the 
mobilization, documentation, and cultural dissemination phases of the uprisings (Hosni, 2017; 
Sadiqi, 2016). Whereas such developments could hint at a potential “fourth wave democratization” 
in the Arab region according to Huntington’s (1991) theorization that any democratic development 
is usually followed by a period of democratic backsliding, this new wave has been little, if at all, 
explored and analysed.  
Therefore, in this article, I adopt a feminist perspective that foregrounds the role of gender 
as the primary focus of analysis in order to examine whether the Arab Spring and its aftermath 
could be theorized as the “fourth wave of democracy”, namely in terms of its impact on women’s 
rights and their resulting social status in the aftermath of the series of revolutions. To do so, I take 
three countries as case studies: Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. In fact, Sadiqi (2016) discusses 
several patterns and similarities between these three countries in terms of the protestors’ intense 
reliance on digital technologies to rally support and document the revolutions and the (gender) 
paradox between women’s high mobilization in the series of uprisings and their blatant exclusion 
from state-building efforts in post-revolutionary Arab states. 
 My argument in this paper is twofold: First, by looking at the interplay between gender 
and the new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), I argue that digital 
technologies played a key role in empowering women to claim equal access to the public sphere 
during the initial “democratic transition” phase that led to the collapse (or reform) of various 
authoritarian regimes across the region between 2010 and 2011. This phase was characterized by 
a large presence of women during the street protests and an intense reliance on new media 
technologies to document the progress of the revolutions. However, a significant backlash against 
women’s secured gains during this first period was evident in the direct aftermath of the uprisings, 
namely between 2011 and 2012, with the rise of various Islamist parties to power that were 
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antagonistic to women’s legal and socio-political rights and their continued presence in the public 
sphere, thereby revealing aspects of a “reverse (feminist) democracy” in the region. Finally, the 
last part of this article focuses on some of the most recent developments that marked the period 
from 2013 to 2016, such as the improvement of women’s legal rights, political participation and 
social status and the surge of women's creative subaltern counter publics to contest the ongoing 
social and gender inequalities in their countries in the period following this initial backlash. Such 
recent developments underscore the cyclical nature and the continuous “wave” pattern of 
democratic development that both confirms and limits Huntington’s theory. 
 
 
Waves of Democracy: From Huntington’s Three First Waves to the Arab Spring  
Huntington’s Three Waves of Democracy 
In order to understand the potentially emerging “fourth wave democracy” in its full 
complexity and implications, it is necessary to go back to previous waves as described by 
Huntington in his seminal work The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
First and foremost, the foundation for Huntington (1991)’s meaning of democracy is derived from 
Dahl (1971)’s classic definition of democracy as a “polyarchy”, that is a form of government in 
which power is invested in many individuals at the same time and where political participation and 
contestation are essential constitutive elements. Huntington’s assessment of democracy is also 
based on electoral competition and widespread voting participation, as well as on the 
institutionalization of checks and balances and the limitations on political power (Huntington, 
1991, p. 7–13). The main idea of Huntington’s (1991) book is that countries undergoing or having 
undergone a transition to democracy during a wave are always subject to democratic backsliding. 
In other words, whenever there is a move toward democracy, such a transition is almost 
systematically followed by a “reverse move”. 
The first wave of democracy began in the early 19th century in the United States with the 
so-called Jacksonian democracy, which was a first attempt to limit slavery in the country and grant 
suffrage to the majority of white males regardless of property ownership and tax payment. At its 
peak, this first wave witnessed the rise of 29 democracies, mainly in the Western world—that is, 
in Western Europe and North America. However, first wave democracy started to fade out when 
Mussolini rose to power in Italy in 1922, followed by Hitler in 1933 in Germany. The decline of 
the first wave lasted from 1922 until 1942, during which the number of democracies in the world 
dropped to a mere 12 (Huntington, 1991). The second wave of democracy began in 1946, following 
the Allied victory in World War II, and lasted for about 20 years, with a steady increase of 
democracies in the Western (and other parts) of the world before starting to decline in 1962 at the 
peak of the Cuba missiles crisis, during which the total number of democracies dropped from 36 
to 30 worldwide between 1962 and the mid-1970s (Ibid.). 
Finally, the third wave began in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, also 
referred to as the 25th of April, a military coup that overthrew the authoritarian regime of 
the Estado Novo. The number of countries that transitioned towards a democratic system during 
this wave amounted roughly to 100 democracies, which was a considerable increase in just a few 
decades. It included, among others, the historic democratic transitions in Latin America during the 
1980s, in Asian Pacific countries from 1986 to 1988- including the Philippines, South Korea, 
and Taiwan-, in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in sub-Saharan Africa 
beginning in 1989. However, some backsliding was evident in the period immediately following 
the onset of the "war on terror" after the September 11, 2001 attacks; moreover, after the Great 
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Recession of 2008, a number of other countries slowly backslided from democracy including 
Thailand, Cambodia, Philippines, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Honduras, and the Maldives.  
Although the notion of “waves of democracy” is widely accepted, their existence is 
contested by several scholars such as Przeworski et al. (2000) and Doorenspleet (2000b). Their 
criticism relates to the fact that Huntington’s waves classification mostly relies on a measure based 
on the percentage of states that were democratic at a historical point in time. However, the number 
of states in the global system itself increased dramatically during Huntington’s period of analysis, 
which was characterized by a series of decolonization processes. The “third wave” was, in this 
sense, not so much an exceptional case that witnessed the rise of numerous (un)democratic states 
as it witnessed merely the rise of nation-states in a “post-colonial” global world. Przeworski et al. 
(2000) also found that transitions between democracies and autocracies in the 1950–1990 period 
occurred mostly in Latin America, and that the rest of the world was relatively stable during this 
period, thereby undermining Huntington’s theory of “reverse democracy” in the context of the 
second and third wave democratization.  Finally, Huntington’s classification can also be critiqued 
for being overtly Eurocentric and pro-Western. For instance, from a feminist critique standpoint, 
Switzerland, which is typically included as part of the first wave, did not grant women the right to 
vote until 1971, in the context of democracy’s third wave only. 
 
Fourth Wave Democracy: On the Origins of Women’s Activism in the Region and the Core Role 
of CyberActivism during the Arab Spring 
In December 2010, the self-burning of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, 
a Tunisian street vendor who was repeatedly harassed and humiliated by the local authorities in 
his hometown, arguably marked the start of the Tunisian revolution and the beginning of the events 
now known as “the Arab Spring.” The Arab Spring was characterized by a series of uprisings that 
sparked across the MENA region to contest and topple several autocratic regimes through both 
violent and non-violent protests, coups, and demonstrations. The uprisings led to the fall of several 
dictatorships including former Tunisian president Ben Ali’s regime (on January 14th, 2011), ex-
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak’s system (on February 11th, 2011), and former Libyan ruler 
Gadhafi’s military regime (on October 20th, 2011). In this context, Howard and Husain (2014) 
argue that new digital technologies played a key role in the rise of both democratic consciousness 
and organizing. 
Democratization movements in the MENA region had existed long before mobile phones 
and the Internet came to these countries during the long years of struggle against colonial rule  in 
the first half of the twentieth century and, subsequently, when a few authoritarian regimes rose to 
prominence in newly-independent Arab states during the second half of the century. One example 
includes the struggle of the Moroccan Left and the Ila-al Amam movement against late King 
Hassan II’s autocratic regime during the infamous Years of Lead that marked Morocco between 
the 1960s and the 1980s. Similarly, women’s activism in the region precedes the digital revolution 
and the Arab Spring and can be traced back at least to the early twentieth century where Arab 
women played active roles in their countries’ independence movements. For instance, Huda 
Sharaawi was both a feminist and an anti-colonial activist and icon during the 1919 Egyptian 
Revolution against British rule (Sadiqi, 2016). The birth of the Egyptian Feminist Union at the 
home Huda Sharaawi in 1923 officially marked the scission between the nationalist movement and 
the feminist movement in post-independent Egypt in a context where women activists were denied 
political and social rights in the wake of the revolution. Similarly, Algerian women also played 
leading roles in the 1954-1962 bloody war of independence against the French through what cooke 
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(2016) describes as “stratégie-femme” (p.32) (i.e., women’s resistance tactics of smuggling 
weapons, hiding dissidents in their homes, and delivering important messages). However, despite 
such overwhelming contributions to the nationalist struggle, Algerian women only constituted they 
1% of the national assembly in post-independence Algeria (cooke, 2016). Finally, during the 1912-
1956 French Protectorate in Morocco, women were also active on two fronts: in the political 
struggle for national independence and in societal debates to improve their access to education and 
schooling in order to put an end to women’s seclusion in the private sphere (Yachoulti, 2015). One 
of the scarce figures of feminist activism back then was Malika Al Fassi, the daughter of the 
founder of the Independence Party, Abbas Al Fassi, who was also one of the founding figures of 
the Akhawat Al Safa in 1944, the first association to openly advocate a feminist agenda in Morocco 
through their demands to abolish polygamy and institutionalize women’s formal education 
(Ennaji, 2016). 
 At the turn of the twenty-first century, the advent of new media technologies allowed Arab 
groups with progressive [democratic and feminist] ideas “to build extensive networks, creat social 
capital, and organize political action” (Howard & Husain, p.18). In fact, in a region like the Middle 
East where traditional media are still subject to massive state control and censorship, digital 
technologies act as alternative media for dissenting and opposing voices, where the free flow of 
information becomes a source of power that enables “political contests to take place over the 
aspirations, values, and imaginations of people” (Gheytanchi and Moghadam 2014, p. 4). In the 
context of the Arab Spring, digital media served as “an ‘information equalizer’, allowing for both 
the telling of compelling stories and the management of all the small communications and logistics 
tasks that must happen in concert if an uprising is to succeed” (Howard & Husain, p.18).  
Howard and Husain (2013) identify five phases to the story of digital media and the Arab 
Spring. First, the preparation phase where the ICTs have enabled social activists to connect with 
one another years prior to the beginning of the Arab Spring in order to build solidarity around 
shared grievances and identify collective political goals starting in the early 2000s. Second, the 
ignition phase where digital technologies allowed activists to capitalize on an isolated incident, 
such as the self-immolation of a street vendor in Tunisia, a blogger in Egypt or a single mother in 
Morocco, which was deliberately ignored by the mainstream state-controlled media in order to 
enrage the public. Third, the street protests phase in which activists were able to organize and 
coordinate the series of offline demonstrations digitally. Fourth, the international buy-in phase 
where protesters mobilized international support, including global diasporas, overseas agencies 
and governments, through the documentation of the uprisings and the sharing of stories of regime 
abuse on various online platforms. Finally, Arab activists also strongly relied on the ICTs during 
the climax state phase in order to document the gains secured or the backlash incurred in the 
aftermath of the uprisings, in a context where their demands were either met by their governments 
or faced a protracted stalemate as it was evident in subsequent cases of civil wars. 
In Tunisia, digital technologies played a key role during the ignition phase of the 
revolution. In the early days of the Jasmine revolution, the media blackout around the tragic death 
of Mohamed Bouazizi in mainstream news media and the wide circulation of photos and videos 
of his plight in the hospital prior to his death on various social media sites sparked the first series 
of protests in Sidi Bouzid in December 2010 which eventually led to the start of the Tunisian 
revolution (Ryan, 2011). Similarly, in the context of the Egyptian Spring, a Facebook-led 
campaign to memorialize a murdered blogger, Khalid Said, who had been beaten to death by the 
Egyptian police, converted anti-Mubarak sentiment to general civil disobedience and played a 
crucial role in both the street protests and the international buy-in phases of the Egyptian 
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revolution. In 2011, images of the young blogger’s dead body which were widely shared on social 
media using mobile phones led to the surge of indignation and popular discontent throughout the 
country and beyond (Howard & Husain, 2013). Likewise, inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions, young Moroccan activists created an online digital campaign consisting of a series of 
videos to voice their dissatisfaction with the monarchy's top-down approach and called for a 
national march in all major cities, which was at the origin of the so-called February 20th Movement 
(20-FMV) of the “Moroccan Spring” (Abadi, 2014). As Daadaoui (2017) pertinently points out: 
“The movement’s undeniable feature was that it was born out of several tech savvy youth activists 
using the social media platforms of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube”. However, while the series 
of uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia eventually led to the collapse of Mubarak and Ben Ali’s regimes 
in 2011, Moroccan activists did not demand a change of regime but called, instead, for a “genuine” 
constitutional monarchy and the limitations of the King’s political prerogatives, which resulted in 
the adoption of a reformed constitution in July 2011 (Boutkhil 2016; Abadi, 2014). In this context, 
digital technologies continued to play an important role in the climax state phase of the Moroccan 
Spring in order to document the gains (or lack thereof) of the 20-FMV. In fact, many Moroccan 
activists expressed their discontentment with the outcomes of the local revolutionary movement, 
through several blogs such as “Mamfakinch” and “Avaaz”, which they perceive has been 
effectively co-opted by the regime given that the newly adopted constitution failed to destabilize 
the status-quo and meet the protestors’ demands on the long run (Daadaoui 2017; Iddins, 2018).  
Therefore, during the series of uprisings that characterized the Arab Spring, digital 
technologies have allowed activists to create a “pressure from below” to destabilize the traditional 
hierarchies of power (Al Rawi 2014, p. 1149), and paved the way for initial democratic transitions 
that were evident in either the toppling of authoritarian regimes—such as in Egypt and Tunisia—
or in the adoption of constitutional reforms, as it was evident in the case of Morocco. Nevertheless, 
it is important to acknowledge that although new media technologies played a key role in the 
democratization movements of the Arab uprisings, several autocratic regimes were also able to 
instrumentalize new technologies and social media platforms to repress and track down activists’ 
movements. Cases in point, the Egyptian security services used Facebook and Twitter as a major 
source of information in order to anticipate the movement of activists during the uprisings, and on 
several occasions in 2011, the Tunisian government attempted to ban Social Networking Sites 
(SNSs) to stop the Jasmine revolution (Freedom House Report, 2012; Howard & Husain, 2013). 
 
 
Fourth Wave Democratization (2010-2011): Cyberfeminism and Women’s Empowerment 
during the Arab Spring Uprisings 
On the Core Role of Cyberfeminism during the Arab Spring  
As mentioned previously, Middle Eastern women’s activism precedes the Arab Spring and 
the digital revolution and can be traced back to the early years of the twentieth century with the 
rise of anti-colonial movements in which women played a central role. Recent events have spurred 
the ideal conditions for the rebirth of Arab women’s activism, where their contributions were once 
again needed, this time to put an end -not to colonial rule but- to authoritarian regimes throughout 
the region in the context of the “Arab Spring”. Arab women played a key role in important stages 
of the 2010-2011 uprisings, which was particularly empowering for them in so far as their activism 
resulted in a greater geographic mobility, better access to the public sphere, and improved social 
status. This suggests that the Arab Spring exemplified, initially, an important democratic 
development in terms of gender equality. In fact, thanks to the advantages of digital technologies, 
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including anonymity, privacy, affordance, and (relative) accessibility, women of all social classes 
were able to contribute significantly to the Arab Spring revolutions (Gheytanchi & Moghadam, 
2014). Women activists were particularly active at three important stages of the uprisings, 
including during the mobilization, the documentation, and the cultural dissemination phases 
(Hosni, 2017). 
During the first phase, Egyptian women bloggers played a leading role in mobilizing mass 
demonstrations of women and girls during the uprisings, which reflected both their dissatisfaction 
with their socio-political status in the Egyptian society and their opposition to Mubarak’s despotic 
regime (Naber, 2011). Asmaa Mahfouz, a 25-year-old woman, called for massive participation in 
the January 25 demonstrations and the abandonment of chauvinist and misogynist attitudes 
through her viral YouTube video that launched the first series of protests in Egypt; she stated the 
following:  
 
“Whoever says women shouldn’t go to the protests because they will get beaten, let 
him have some honor and manhood and come with me on Jan 25. I, a girl, am going 
down to Tahrir Square and will stand by myself and hold up a banner so that people 
may have some honor” (Bernard, Bessis & Cherif 2012, p. 16).  
 
In Tunisia, Lina Ben Mhenni’s blog ATunisiangirl.blogpost.com also played a key role in the start 
of the protests. In January 2011, Lina covered the early weeks of the Jasmine Revolution after 
Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire and documented the news of his tragic death that was absent 
from mainstream media news outlets, thereby sparking national indignation that led people to 
come down onto the streets in protest (Ryan, 2011). Finally, in Morocco, women played a 
particularly important role in the mobilization phase of the protests; 14 activists featured in the 20-
FMV’s YouTube videos announcing the creation of the movement were young women. In fact, 
the first campaign opens with a young woman, Amina Boulghabi, a founding member of the 20-
FMV, and ends with a much older woman who spoke in Darija, the Moroccan dialect. Telling her 
personal story with the Moroccan regime’s corruption and police violence and incarnating the 
persona of the Moroccan grandmother who has faced regime abuse her entire life, the older woman 
called for the right to protest and others to join the movement (Abadi, 2014). In addition, Moroccan 
women’s other various Facebook and Twitter posts also played a role in initiating the 
demonstrations of the movement and paved the way for the rise of virtual activism (Yachoulti, 
2015). 
During the second phase of the documentation of the uprisings, while Egyptian women 
actively protested and demonstrated in masses alongside their male counterparts in Tahrir square 
(Gheytanchi & Moghadam, 2014), Tunisian women’s platforms served as a major source of 
information to document the series of uprisings and call for national and international support, 
where the protests were recorded live on cell phone cameras and uploaded onto various social 
networking sites. For instance, content from Atunisiangirl.blogspot.com was directly used by Al 
Jazeera for international news coverage, in which the woman activist denounced several human 
rights violations committed against non-violent protesters by official authorities during the 
uprisings (Hosni, 2017). Moroccan women were also particularly active during the documentation 
and coordination phase of the protests. They helped create several Facebook group pages that were 
affiliated with the 20-FMV’s page, and they urged their Moroccan counterparts to take part in the 
protests while keeping them informed about the dates and locations of the movement’s meetings 
and rallies (Yachoulti, 2015). Various websites such as “mamfakinch.com” (we will never give 
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up) and “lakome.com” (To You) allowed Moroccan women activists to share regular updates and 
information about the movement’s achievements (Iddins 2018). More importantly, Moroccan 
women served as spokespersons of the 20-FMV’s movement during the series of protests; they 
also took to the front lines and confronted security forces, protecting their male counterparts from 
police brutality (Yachoulti, 2015). Hasna, another female activist in the movement, reported her 
experience during the 20-FMV’s protests: “We walked side by side with men. Some women were 
even more courageous than men, they had shown greater audacity and zeal than that shown by 
men” (Ibid., 904). 
Finally, during the cultural dissemination phase, Moroccan, Tunisian, and Egyptian women 
activists were able to promote a culture of active citizenry and move from critiquing to contributing 
to social justice and the development of their societies (Hosni, 2017). In Egypt, women activists 
of the Women on Walls graffiti movement have been resorting to creativity as a basic revolutionary 
tool during the series of protests to paint Cairo’s walls and articulate their vision of an ideal society- 
one that is free of police abuse, sexual harassment, and other forms of gender-based violence 
(cooke, 2016). In Tunisia, Lina Ben Mhenni launched her initiative “Books to Prisons” campaign 
for political prisoners who would go on hunger strikes to claim their right to read in Tunisian 
prisons and promote a culture of human rights through her blog (Hosni, 2017). Finally, in Morocco, 
women’s rights organizations seized the momentum created by the 20-FVM to create a new 
coalition under the name the “Spring of Dignity” in 2013 following the tragic suicide of a teenager 
who was forced to marry her rapist in order to demand the official criminalization of domestic 
violence and rape (Sadiqi, 2016; Yachoulti, 2015). Therefore, Arab women have played a 
significant role in their countries’ democratic transitions during the series of uprisings, where 
women’s movements and broader social movements have rather become “intertwined social 
phenomenon” (Gheytanchi & Moghadam, 2014, p. 2). In fact, women’s activism reflected their 
discontent with both their social status and the governments in place and contributed to press for 
gender-sensitive reforms and political change, concomitantly.  
 
The Arab Spring: Women’s Empowerment and Fourth Wave Democratization 
Through their continuous reliance and mobilization of new media technologies, Arab 
women’s active participation in the series of uprisings contributed to their temporary 
empowerment, namely in terms of increased geographic mobility, access to the public sphere and 
the development of a transnational feminist network of women’s solidarity. In Egypt, women’s 
contributions to the uprisings during which they marched alongside men was particularly 
empowering for them, as they were never involved in a community with equal rights before 
(Gheytanchi & Moghadam, 2014). In fact, women’s invasion of Tahrir Square during the series of 
uprisings could be seen as a political act and a way of ‘doing politics’ in itself, given that the public 
sphere in Egypt is traditionally seen as the sole domain of men, and that women are strongly 
encouraged to remain in the confines of the private sphere. Therefore, in 2011, the 18 days of 
protests in Tahrir Square constituted a “time out of time” and a “rupture” from the status quo, 
where gender segregation is otherwise very much prevalent, and women are relatively invisible in 
the public sphere (Wahba, 2016, p.67). In this sense, Egyptian women’s (cyber)activism has also 
contributed to bridge the public/private and men/women dichotomy that is used to characterize 
Arab women in several secularization theories (Hosni, 2017, p.5). Moreover, the Egyptian 
revolution witnessed the development of new forms of solidarity between women from various 
religious backgrounds—including Muslims and Christians—and social classes, where upper, 
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middle and lower class women came together under the common objective of “Defying the 
Regime, Defying Patriarchy” (Wahba, 2016, p.67).  
In Tunisia, the women’s empowerment aspect was evident in the leadership positions that 
women assumed during the Jasmine revolution. For instance, Lina Ben Mhenni became a leading 
figure in citizen journalism through the role of her trilingual blog in which she documented the 
progress of the Tunisian revolution at local, regional, and international levels. This was facilitated 
by her presence on the ground as she filmed and recorded the protests live despite the government’s 
multiple intimidation attempts to block and censor content on her blog (Hosni, 2017). Speaking 
about the role of the Tunisian revolution in setting a model of transnational solidarity as well as a 
revolutionary ideal for other insurgent Arab states to follow, Yahyaoui, one of the leading Tunisian 
activists, reported: “We have this huge responsibility to show to the world, and to the Arab world, 
that we can succeed. Even if we are focusing on Tunisia, we are doing it for the entire region” 
(Hosni 2017, p. 15).  
Finally, the Moroccan February 20th movement also exemplified an important women’s 
empowerment aspect through the creation of a feminist sub-branch of the movement, the so-called 
“Feminist Spring for Equality and Democracy” (Yachoulti, 2015). Founded in March 2011, the 
aim of the coalition was to integrate a gender-sensitive aspect to the Moroccan Spring, and 
particularly to the new envisioned constitution. Therefore, one of the earliest achievements of this 
feminist coalition was the development of a memorandum reflecting women’s various demands, 
their vision of the new constitution, and their role in the Moroccan society. The memorandum 
particularly emphasized the principles of parity and the constitutionalizing of women’s gains and 
rights in order to promote and guarantee equal political, economic, social, cultural, and civil rights 
for men and women (Yachoulti, 2015). The 20-FMV also led to the development of a new 
consciousness of feminist activism among the younger generation of Moroccan women, where 
women from all walks of life, including social classes, ideologies and political affiliations, came 
together under the same unifying movement and its feminist sub-branch (Sadiqi, 2016). In this 
sense, the “Feminist Spring for Equality and Democracy” deployed a gender-sensitive approach 
to push for social change, placing gender equality at the center of a larger discussion of Moroccan 
citizenry and constitutional reforms. Ultimately, in terms of transnational solidarity, the feminist 
coalition of the “Moroccan Spring” did not limit itself to acting at the local level but also sought 
to develop coalitions at the MENA region level in order to “unify women of the region against 
dictatorship, inequality, and marginalization” (Yachoulti, 2015, p. 905).  
As a consequence, Al Rawi (2014) sheds light on the collective identity and character that 
is forged through Arab women’s (online) movements to challenge gender inequality and unite 
several men and women activists across Arab states. Likewise, Gheytanchi & Moghadam (2014) 
underscore how this new transnational and electronic communicative sphere has facilitated the 
emergence of a “new Arab public sphere” and a “distinct community” within the Arab world today. 
In fact, Arab women's active roles during the series of uprisings have contributed to deconstructing 
the perception of Arab women as powerless, invisible, voiceless, and victims (Abadi, 2014). 
Through their strategic use of digital technologies, Egyptian, Moroccan, and Tunisian women were 
able to contribute concomitantly to the struggle against authoritarianism and gender inequality, 
which, in turn, was particularly empowering for them in terms of access to the public sphere and 
improved social status to promote a feminist agenda. Foregrounding gender and the role of new 
media technologies, the Arab Spring has, in this sense, materialized as a case of fourth wave 
democracy. However, as cooke (2016) pertinently points out: 
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“In revolutions, as in wars, norms and values are suspended ‘for the duration’ in 
order to accommodate necessary breaches of what is normally considered 
appropriate. It also shows that when the crisis is over, the cultural police try to 
restore traditional gender norms in an attempt to ‘squeeze the genie back into the 
lamp.’” (p.31).  
 
Likewise, a parallel can be drawn between Arab women’s active contributions to the Arab 
Spring and their resulting social status in the period directly following the uprisings. 
 
 
Fourth Wave “Reverse Democracy” (2011-2012): The Backlash against Women’s Rights in 
the Aftermath of the Arab Spring  
The Rise of Political Islam and the Legal Backlash against Women’s Rights 
Whereas women have occupied a center stage in the so-called Arab Spring revolutions, 
their active contributions have not been effectively translated into egalitarian and progressive 
legislations that guarantee their rights as equal citizens and encourage their political representation 
and labor participation in the aftermath of those revolutions (Sadiqi, 2016). The first backlash 
against women’s rights materialized in terms of the rise of Islamist parties to power for the first 
time in the history of many Arab states, which were very much antagonistic towards women’s 
socio-political and legal rights. In Tunisia, the rise of political Islam to power culminated with the 
election of Ennahda in the aftermath of the Jasmine revolution in 2011. Because of its conservative 
agenda, the party constituted a direct threat to women’s rights in several respects, especially with 
regards to the gains made in the 1956 Tunisian Personal Status Code under Bourguiba (Hamza, 
2016). Cases in point, in 2012, article 28 of the newly adopted constitution under Ennahda 
foregrounded complementary—not equal—roles for men and women in the Tunisian society 
(Arfaoui, 2016).  
In Egypt, such a “gender paradox” was also evident in the new constitution that was 
adopted under Morsi’s post-revolutionary Islamist government in 2012, which not only re-
emphasized women’s family and reproductive roles, but also foregrounded the role of religion and 
Shari’a in regulating all aspects of their lives (McLarney, 2016). Further, with an overtly Islamist-
dominated committee, the new constitution adopted a conservative stance against women’s 
divorce and custody rights and the appointment of women’s judges; as a result, an Egyptian female 
deputy president of the Constitutional Court lost her position following the adoption of the new 
constitution (Khattab, 2016). Because of its pro-child marriage stance, the 2012 constitution also 
violated many of CEDAW’s fundamental principles--i.e. the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Khattab, 2016). 
In 2011, Morocco also witnessed the rise of its first Islamist democratically elected party 
since the country’s accession to independence in 1956, which quickly revealed its anti-feminist 
agenda by rejecting the Government Agenda for Equality 2011–2015 (Boutkhil, 2016). In addition, 
although article 19 of the newly adopted constitution in July 2011 stipulates several advances for 
women’s rights, it also highlighted an important limitation: that such developments can only take 
place “with [the] respect for […] the constants and of the laws of the Kingdom” (Ibid., p. 254), 
thereby re-emphasizing the primacy of monarchy, tradition, and religion over women’s rights in 
the country. In this context, Boutkhil (2016) speaks about “feminine liminal citizenship” to 
characterize the status of women in post-Arab Spring Morocco “whereby their full citizenship is 
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not attained or sometimes denied despite its being fully recognized in the new constitution” (p. 
251).  
 
Arab Women’s Lack of Political Representation in the Aftermath of the Uprisings  
In addition, the Arab Spring has also contributed a backlash against women’s political 
rights in terms of their access to decision-making. This was evident in women’s lower levels of 
representation in political offices directly following the uprisings. In Egypt, women only made up 
25% of the elected councils and 2% of the newly constituted parliament in 2011, compared to 12% 
(69 seats in parliament) before the outbreak of the uprisings under Mubarak’s regime (Khattab, 
2016). Likewise, in Tunisia, women’s political representation under the newly formed government 
of Ennahda was even lower than under Ben Ali’s regime; while women made up 27% of 
parliamentarians in 2009, at a time when the government also had 4 women ministers, in April 
2011, Tunisian women were only granted 2 out of 31 ministries and made up less than half of the 
members of the new transitional body (Hamza, 2016). They also only accounted for 23% of the 
members of the new parliament, which amounted to a total of 49 seats, out of which 43 were 
granted to women from the Ennahda Islamist party (Hamza, 2016). In fact, elected Tunisian 
women were instrumentalized as political tools by Ennahda to display and boast gender parity 
without them having the necessary gender-sensitive background to advocate for women’s rights 
effectively (Ibid.). In Morocco, the appointment of only one female Minister of Social and Family 
Affairs under the first Islamist-led government in 2011, compared to 6 women before the outbreak 
of the Feb 20th movement, and its reluctance to implement the gender 
parity provisions of the new constitution, were but two of the new alarming examples that have 
severely disappointed Moroccan women in the direct aftermath of the local reformist movement 
(Yachoulti, 2015; Ennaji, 2016).  
 
The Rise of New Forms of Violence against Women in the Post-Arab Spring Context 
Another aspect of the backlash against women’s rights in the period directly following the 
uprisings was the rise of new forms of violence against them. In Egypt, several authors point out 
that a “counterrevolution” took place in post-revolutionary Egypt where women’s continued 
protests to advocate for a gender-sensitive agenda under the newly formed Islamist government 
were met with unprecedented levels of government violence and brutality including virginity 
testing, gang rapes, police beatings, sexual harassment, and systemic violence against women 
protesters (Wahba, 2016). An emblematic figure of the regime’s brutality against women is a 
police officer dragging a topless woman, with what would become an iconic blue bra, in Egypt 
(cooke, 2016). Other forms of violence included the restoration of the long-dated practice of 
Female Genital Multilation (FGM) by Morsi’s government in 2012, which was a direct backlash 
against the anti-FGM movement prior to 2010 and a violation of another of CEDAW’s 
fundamental principles (Khattab, 2016; McLarney, 2016). Likewise, in Tunisia, the newly formed 
government in 2011 not only denies rights to children born out of wedlock, it also encourages and 
legitimizes violence against women including sexual harassment and the repression and 
intimidation of women’s initiatives calling for gender justice and equal rights (Hamza, 2016). In 
2012, a Tunisian woman was charged with indecency after being raped on the streets (Ennaji 
2016). During the same year, activist Lina Ben Mhenni was assaulted and tortured by the police 
for protesting article 28 of the new constitution which emphasized complementary roles for men 
and women in Tunisian society (Errazzouki, 2012).  
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Similarly, many Moroccan women activists during the Feb 20th movement reported that 
they received threats and were met with strong opposition because of their activism; some 
confessed receiving threatening messages via Facebook and phone calls. Kamilia Raouyane, an 
intern at the Moroccan Association of Human Rights, said that she received calls at 3 a.m.—
someone calling her a whore and threatening sexual violence—at the very start of the movement. 
Other activists reported being strongly discouraged by their families to partake in the protests for 
risking being jailed and tortured by the police (Yachoulti, 2015).  
Therefore, by foregrounding gender equality as the focus of my analysis, the aftermath of 
the Arab Spring was a clear case of “reverse democracy” in terms of the legal, political, and social 
backlashes against women’s rights where their active contributions to the series of uprisings were 
met with unprecedented levels of violence, repression, exclusion, and marginalization in the post-
revolutionary contexts between 2011 and 2012. However, more recent developments in the MENA 
region, beginning in 2013 onwards, strongly signal the integration of a more gender-sensitive 
approach and a pro-women’s rights agenda. 
 
 
Fourth Wave “Democratization in the Making” (2013-2016): Capitalizing on Women’s 
Gains in the Post-Revolutionary Contexts 
“Pro-Gender Equality” Politico-Legal Developments: The Reform of the Constitutions 
In this context, one of the major developments concerned the revision of the constitutions 
that were adopted in the period directly following the revolutions in order to guarantee better rights 
for women. In 2014, a new constitution in Egypt adopted a rather liberal stance under Al-Sissi’s 
“secular” regime, following the overthrow of Morsi’s Islamist rule, and emphasized the role of the 
state in guaranteeing gender equality in all aspects of social life, including in high-level 
management positions, in political offices, in the judiciary, and in parliament; it also widely 
condemned the widespread social plague of domestic violence (Mclarney, 2016). Echoing these 
reforms, 89 women were elected following the 2014 parliamentary elections, compared to less 
than 2 percent during the Islamist-led parliament of 2012 (Ibid.). However, the notion of 
complementary roles between men and women in the family, which implies a sexual contract, was 
not completely abandoned in the reformed constitution, and the Sharia—or Islamic family law—
was still defined as the primary source of legislation under Al-Sissi’s new military dictatorship 
(Khattab, 2016).  
Likewise, in January 2014, a new constitution that strongly protects women’s rights was 
voted in Tunisia. Article 46 particularly insists on the provision of equal opportunities for men and 
women to have access to all levels of responsibility and in all domains. It also emphasizes gender 
parity in elected assemblies, the eradication of gender-based violence, and the ratification of the 
CEDAW without any reservations (Hamza, 2016). As a consequence of the implementation of the 
parity law, the 2014 elections witnessed a stark increase in female heads of legislative lists 
compared to 2011, in addition to the increase in both women’s voting and nominations in political 
constituencies and as presidential candidates, which signals Tunisian women’s growing political 
participation and representation (Arfaoui, 2016).  
Similarly, in 2013, the Moroccan government adopted the National Charter to Reform the 
Justice System, which centers women as their target priority, as well as the National Strategy to 
Combat Violence Against Women that criminalizes sexual harassment (Elattir, El Allame & Tihm, 
2016). On January 23, 2014, thanks to the concerted efforts of women’s rights organizations within 
the framework of the “Spring of Dignity”, the revision of Article 475 of the Penal Code led to the 
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abolition of the archaic law that allows rapists to escape prosecution by marrying their victims, 
following the tragic suicide of Amina Filali, a 16-year-old girl who swallowed rat poison after 
being forced to marry her rapist (Boutkhil, 2016; Iddins, 2018). Finally, the adoption of the 
Government Plan for Equality ‘ICRAM’ 2012-2016 aimed to further institutionalize parity and 
achieve a set of reforms touching upon women’s social status and access to the public sphere in 
Morocco including in the Family Code, the Criminal Code, the Labor Code, the Nationality Code, 
the Election Code, and the Collective Charter (Yachoulti, 2015). These changes were adopted 
thanks to the continued (transnational) efforts of individual women activists and women’s NGOs 
in the post-revolutionary context to promote gender equality and social justice concomitantly, such 
as the Moroccan feminist coalition of the “Spring of Dignity” and others that will be discussed in 
the following section. These women’s organizations put increasing pressure on the newly elected 
government to institutionalize gender equality in post-Arab Spring states to both guarantee their 
legitimacy and acknowledge women’s active contributions to the series of uprisings. 
 
The Surge of Women’s NGOs and the Rise of Subaltern Counter-publics to Advocate for Social 
Justice 
In fact, another important development which signals recent major advances in Arab 
women’s rights following the backlash against their rights in the period following the uprisings is 
the surge of women-led (individual and collective) initiatives that advocate for social justice. In 
post-revolutionary Egypt, women artist-activists are currently resorting to creative disobedience 
(i.e. art activism) as a basic revolutionary tool to protest ongoing gender and social inequalities in 
their country (Badran, 2016). In this context, Wahba (2016) discusses the rise of “subaltern 
counter-publics” to characterize the new spheres that are currently created by Egyptian women 
who are excluded from the public sphere. Along with the development of several street theater 
initiatives led by women—such as El-Batt El-Eswed (The Odd Ducks), a theatre collective 
founded in 2013 to promote feminist storytelling—graffiti art continues to rise to prominence from 
the time of the uprisings to share Egyptian women’s painful stories and give them greater visibility 
in the public sphere (cook, 2016; El Nossery, 2016). For instance, the famous “Don’t touch or 
castration awaits you” graffiti denounces the widespread sexual assaults, virginity testing, and 
sexual harassment of women in post-revolutionary Egypt. In this case, graffiti symbolizes a form 
of resistance and activism, as well as a form of talking back to and subversion of dominant power 
(Wahba, 2016). Such developments can, in fact, be paralleled with Marwan Kraidy’s (2016) 
concept of revolutionary creative labor during the Arab Spring which he characterizes as “artful 
dissent”.  
Another example of the development of those subaltern counter-publics in post-
revolutionary Arab states is the organization by the Moroccan Feb 20th movement of a 
performative act in front of the Rabat parliament until the title of "Freeze for Democracy" in 
response to the government's allegations that the movement has promoted sheer violence and 
disunity in the country since its outbreak. Young female and male activists used their bodies to 
'perform' their message with utter silence and peace, thereby providing a counter-narrative to the 
government’s false accusations of brutality and chaos (Abadi, 2014, p.18). Their main message 
was that democracy, like their bodies, was frozen both in time and in space. In addition, Sadiqi 
(2016) talks about the emergence of an ideological center following the events of February 20th in 
Morocco that caters to women’s voices and defies the classical dichotomy between secularists and 
Islamists, mainly through the activist role of several women’s NGOs in the country. She posits 
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that this movement highlights the possibility of remedying the longstanding dichotomy between 
the modernists and the traditionalists that was inherited from colonial time in Morocco (i.e.1940s). 
 Similarly, a notable development in post-revolutionary Tunisia is the emergence of 
women’s poetry in the Tunisian Arabic dialect that tells women’s stories of the revolution and the 
backlash against their rights (Labidi, 2016). The objective of such initiatives is to deplore the 
prevailing chauvinist social and cultural norms in the region and alter the social perceptions of 
women. Another development also includes the rise of prominent women cartoonists through the 
Union of Cartoon and Comic Strip Artists who mix public humor with critique of authority in 
order to parallel Ben Ali’s tyrannical rule with that of the newly elected Ennahda (Labidi, 2016). 
Ultimately, the surge of women’s NGOs and grassroots organizations in Tunisia contributes 
significantly to such democracy-building efforts. Over the past few years, there has been an 
increasingly important role of civil society in post-revolutionary Tunisia through NGOs such as 
l’Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates and the Association des Femmes Tunisiennes 
pour la Recherche et le Développement, as well as an increasing number of female candidates in 
National Constituent Assembly elections which promote a more gender-sensitive approach in 




Drawing on Huntington’s concept of “waves of democratization” and adopting essentially 
a feminist perspective, this article aimed to explore and assess the extent to which Huntington’s 
model applied to the case of the Arab Spring. My objective was to examine whether the Arab 
Spring could be theorized as a case of “fourth wave democracy” by paying close attention to 
women’s roles during the series of uprisings and their resulting social statuses in each of Morocco, 
Egypt and Tunisia. The research has revealed that the Arab uprisings did, in fact, exemplify 
important features of a “wave of democratization” as theorized by Huntington (1991) in so far as 
they resulted in an initial democratic transition during the first phase. During the series of uprisings 
(2010-2011), Moroccan, Tunisian, and Egyptian women activists have been able to contribute 
effectively to the struggle against authoritarianism and gender inequality thanks to their tactical 
use of digital technologies, which, in turn, resulted in their direct empowerment in terms of 
increased geographic mobility, access to the public sphere, and improved social status.  
On the other hand, as Huntington’s theory suggests that whenever there is a move toward 
democracy, the transition is usually followed by a reverse move, the Arab Spring also validates 
the assumption with regards to women’s rights and, in this sense, can be characterized as a case of 
“reverse democracy”. In fact, whereas women actively contributed to the series of uprisings 
through the creation of a transnational movement that resulted in their “temporary” empowerment, 
the period directly following the uprisings (2011-2012) witnessed a severe deterioration of 
women’s social status, in light of the rise of political Islam to power, the limitations on women’s 
political participation, the backlash against their legal rights and fundamental CEDAW principles, 
and, finally, the rise of extreme forms of violence against them.  
However, in light of more recent developments beginning in 2013 onwards, including the 
revision of the newly adopted constitutions to integrate gender parity and a gender-sensitive 
agenda, the surge of women’s NGOs in the region and the rise of women’s (creative) subaltern 
counter-publics, Arab women have been able to significantly advance their rights during the last 
few years (2013-2016) and capitalize on their gains in the post-revolutionary contexts. This last 
development could signal a limitation to Huntington’s theory, in the sense that the “reverse wave” 
312 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 22, No. 9 September 2021 
is not the last or ultimate move, and that more progressive developments can, in turn, (re)emerge 
from backlash, therefore drawing the picture of a cycle rather than a wave. It is, however, somehow 
also a validation of his hypothesis that democratic developments are constantly shifting and 
fluctuating. In this sense, a wave of democracy or democratic transition would not consist of a 
single “wave” per se, but many.  
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that the French Republique, a model of democracy 
today, was not directly born out of the 1789 French Revolution. It did witness a major backlash 
against human rights in the period directly following the “people’s revolution” which was 
commonly known as “the years of terror”. The system then slowly transitioned towards the 
democratic model as we know it today. In this sense, as recent developments in the Arab region 
seem to suggest, the Arab Spring could not so much be a case of reverse democracy as a possible 
“fourth wave democracy” in the making. Future research could examine the ensuing period that 
this paper did not cover (2017-2020) to assess the situation in light of more recent developments 
in the fields of women’s rights and democratic governance in the MENA region. 
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